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LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE.

FRANCE.

M. GEORGES LECHALAS offers us a number of *Æsthetical Studies* which without question rank among the very best that have been published on this subject for a long time. It is true, he expounds and discusses rather than offers positive contributions; but I am far from criticising him for having done so. In questions so complicated and delicate as the present, it is befitting first to acquire knowledge, and it is to this task that he applies himself with success.

In the first three studies, which are entitled "The Beautiful and the Ugly," "What is Art?" "Art and Nature," M. Lechalas prepares for the examination of a most important problem, which he exhaustively treats in the three following studies: "Art and Mathematics," "Suggestion in Art," "Alliances and Associations of the Different Arts."

There is at the basis of our organic nature a tendency to rhythm; if it is difficult to discover this rhythm in our movements, it is because our will almost always intervenes as a disturbing element. Very conspicuous in music, there is less rhythm expressed in ordinary speech, but much more of it in oratory, and still more in poetry. M. Lechalas recalls on this subject the experiments of the Abbé Thiéry at Louvain, from which it would follow that the spoken word exhibits all the essential characters of music and notably the relation of all the notes to the tonic, with this difference, that the tonic is here not very distinct; but whatever the characters common to music and poetry may be, he correctly says, it is in music alone that we can study with precision the mathe-

matical laws controlling the pitch of sounds. He sketches very rapidly the transition from the natural gamut to the Ptolemæan gamut, and then enters upon an examination of the theory of the natural gamut as explained by the Abbé De Lescluze,—a theory which is the more important, as this last-named author has based on the same conception a theory of colors.

This is not the place to expound the last-named theory, even if I could do so in a few words; but it is very clear that this question of the relation of music to painting is sown with snares, as the many divergent explanations it has received show. If the two stimuli, sound and light, have as their base the same physical element, viz., vibration, their elaboration in the sensory organs has differentiated them strangely, and the translations which have been made of them in the brain are not exactly comparable. Musicians cannot speak of color, or painters of *timbre*, save by metaphor. The gamuts of the painter rest on two principles, coloring and illumination; that is to say, on the order of the wave-lengths and on the degree of saturation; and they are thus, by their composition, quite different from the musical gamuts and render any complete comparison between the register of colors and that of sounds difficult. And if these difficulties did not prevent our discovering an analogy between the two, they yet indicate that we must be on our guard against misunderstandings into which language can lead us.

But we hasten to add, the question is not that of exhaustively comparing excitants and sensations; the sole thing at issue for a rational theory of æsthetical affinity is to discover a "law of rhythm" which shall be the same for the hearing as for vision. One point already gained is that there exists a law of rhythm for each one of these two senses; but it is legitimate to push the analysis farther, and I also am of the opinion with M. Lechalas that we are not pursuing a chimera in attempting to reduce sensibility to mathematical formulæ, although this reduction has hitherto not been accomplished save in an imperfect manner and by the aid of hypotheses.

I shall not speak of the last studies of M. Lechalas's work, viz., "Art and Curiosity," "Art and Ethics," despite their interest-

ing character, as this would lead me too far. The book is truly one to be read.

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DR. PAUL RICHER of the Academy of Medicine, to whom we already owe a rare and beautiful illustrated work, "Art and Medicine," begins with an *Introduction* an important collection of books which is to bear the title of *The Human Figure*.¹ It is to be devoted to the study of the human form in all its aspects and all its conditions as well as to the history of its representation by the artists of all times and countries. Scientists and writers on art will contribute to this collective work, which will be profusely and very carefully illustrated. I therefore expressly call the attention of our readers to this interesting enterprise. The introduction which is offered to them treats in particular the study of the nude, of the relations of art and science, and of the problem of æsthetics connected therewith. M. Paul Richer looks forward with confidence to the future of art, which in his opinion is bound up with the future of science; and he shows himself in this attitude to be diametrically opposed to the discouraging opinions of Taine and Renan.

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In connection with these books on æsthetics, I shall mention a thesis presented to the University of Berne, Switzerland, by M. PAUL PETEUT, in which this author expounds the doctrines of the Abbé Baptiste Dubos (1670-1742) as a sort of contribution to the history of æsthetic doctrines in France. Dubos, according to German authors, is the most widely cited of our æsthetic writers, and his influence on German æsthetics is unquestionable. This little work, which is a very good *résumé* of its subject, comes at the right time and deserves to be well received.

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I had some criticisms to offer on a former philosophical work (*Que sais je?*) of M. SULLY-PRUDHOMME, one of the rare poets of our day, and an enlightened and interesting spirit. His present volume, *Le problème des causes finales*, is the fruit of a noble effort,

¹ Paris, Gaultier-Magnier. When no publisher is mentioned, it is understood that the books are published by F. Alcan.

and of a penetrating thought. It is made up of letters addressed to M. Charles Richet on the occasion of an article published by the latter in the *Revue Scientifique* under the title "L'effort vers la vie et la théorie des causes finales." M. Sully-Prudhomme analyses the concept of finality with great skill and points out the conditions under which this concept remains scientific and at what moment it becomes metaphysical. He endeavors to present a just criticism of determinism as well as of that doctrine of final causes which involves "liberty," or the new character of an act independent and "conditioning." He asks "how can there have arisen in him the consciousness of that sort of activity which in the determinist conception of the universe not only does not exist but, right the contrary, is the negation of what exists, viz., universal determinism?" His poetic instinct recoils from renouncing the salvation of things, "which I would not believe to be chimerical," he says, "save in the last extremity." In the course of his patient discussions he has ingenious comparisons to offer and many profound *aperçus*; thus, for example, he remarks that mind and matter, which appear to us to be irreducible one to another, when we consider them in their phenomena, actually tend to become identified when we descend regressively to the substratum. He is inclined accordingly to monism.

He also emphasises the remarkable and evident fact of the contradiction which inheres in the data of metaphysics; but he does not to my mind draw with sufficient boldness the conclusion which must be drawn for the necessity which forces us to include our judgments under the category of antinomies. Occupied as I myself am at the present moment in pondering anew upon the problems of which M. Sully-Prudhomme here treats, I find that my thought is at times in agreement with his and at times finds its consummation in it. Many readers, I believe, will derive profit from the reading of his book, even though some will not accept its prudent reservations or others its inspiring idea.

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M. PAULHAN adds a new volume, *Analystes et esprits synthétiques*, to his beautiful series of works on character. It is perhaps the

most interesting of them all. He studies here with care and penetration the two classes of men who are distinguished by characteristic tendencies toward analysis or toward synthesis. He describes the different types, examining their good qualities and their deficiencies, and finally he shows how these two types of mind, so much opposed to each other in their striking manifestations, are at bottom complementary and accomplish by their joint labor the entire work of the mind.

I might perhaps have some objections to make regarding the attribution of one of these types rather than the other to such and such painter or musician. It is at least interesting to observe that the painter Eugène Delacroix, "synthesist" for example, had no taste for the methods of Victor Hugo, although they were quite similar to his own, and preferred the classical Racine to this god of the romanticists. The literary judgments of a painter may involve the appreciation in poetry of other qualities than those which he possesses in his own art, and it is difficult to say of any given individual that his nature is absolutely synthetic or analytic if we take him in his entirety.

As to the classification of characters, the work of M. Paulhan nevertheless affords us the most important distinction which can be made, when we come to consider exclusively the intellectual qualities of the individual. Hitherto he had distinguished minds as logical and illogical, which was a different mode of estimating the qualities of the intellect. But this second point of view is of secondary importance as compared with the other,—at least, in so far as the correctness or incorrectness of the intellectual operations is not concerned with the operation and the union of elements put into play either by an analysis or a synthesis.

Correctness and incorrectness, moreover, depend also on the quality of the affective and sensorial data which enter into the operations of our mind, and for this reason the value of our judgment may be influenced by our affective character. Everything is connected together in that living synthesis which each one of us is,—sentiment, thought, and action.

In a volume entitled *Essai d'une philosophie de la solidarité*, a collection of lectures and discussions by M. LÉON BOURGEOIS and others, we shall not find much light on the problems which the word *solidarity* suggests; in fact, the extreme confusion of ideas relative to this problem is very evident from the work. None of these discussions appear to be practical, and I see in them only the ingenious exercises of sociological thought, pretty much as the controversies of the Middle Ages were ingenious exercises in metaphysical dialectics. The idealogues go their way and life goes its way. Practice creates every day more facts than our hesitating theories explain. They are baffled by the wealth of the social facts that spring spontaneously from the necessities of existence, and cannot profit much from oratorical tilts. Moreover, solidarity is a fact, but the feeling for this fact is not in itself a virtue, neither can the expression of this fact form a doctrine. As long as pity, compassion, and love are mingled with the sentiment of solidarity, it will merge itself in the good old "charity"; as long as we treat of these things by the way of science, it is nothing more than a special point of view of sociology.

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From the pen of M. KARPPE, a scholar of great erudition, we have *Essais de critique et d'histoire de philosophie*, treating of Philo and the early Fathers, of the ideas surrounding rising Christianity, Maimonides, Richard Simon, Spinoza, etc.,—an interesting volume the reading of which I very strongly recommend.

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M. CAMILLE BOS has chosen as a subject for study *The Psychology of Belief* (*Psychologie de la croyance*). He shows belief to be connected with our *activity* as expressing it in all its degrees and transforming itself and elevating itself according as the individual frees himself from automatism and becomes more personal. Our belief, he says, is the force which moves the world; it expresses our progressive faculty, it supplements our ignorance of the universe, and adds itself to our science in order to fulfil it. It will exist, therefore, as long as contradiction and incertitude exist for human reason, which is tantamount to saying that it is indispen-

sable to our reason, and it transcends logic and expresses the very postulate of life.

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M. PAUL LAPIE devotes a large volume to the subject of *The Logic of the Will* (*Logique de la volonté*). I can only indicate his point of view, which is to show how the act of willing depends on our judgments and how all the characters of will are explained by the characters of our judgments, so rendering it necessary for us to resort to a mysterious power to explain human action.

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M. E. GOBLOT recapitulates in his *Justice et liberté* the elementary truths of ethics and expounds them with originality and force. I shall note here in passing the reaction which is manifesting itself in psychology in favor of intellectualism. It is one of the phases of the inevitable alternation which theories undergo. The notion of the unconscious has succeeded the classical division of the faculties of the soul, and in its turn this notion of a physiological motor is tending to resolve itself for certain authors into the study of directly apprehensible operations of the mind.

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M. ADOLPHE LANDRY discusses very tersely the problem of penal responsibility (*La responsabilité pénale*). He dismisses the ancient doctrine of expiation by punishment and sees in punishment only a means by which society has endeavored to combat crime. The notion of degrees of responsibility is undoubtedly connected with the classical doctrine, that punishment, being expiatory, should be proportioned to the offence committed. But it is also justified from the point of view of utility, according to which punishments should be chosen that are most useful socially. In practice we did not arrive at this result by *individualising* punishment, as certain criminologists have suggested. It would be more advisable to establish degrees of responsibility and "to divide the subjects for punishment into classes, the same treatment being reserved for all members of the same class"; the penal treatment, on the other hand, would be so calculated as to assure intimidation

and example; and the classes would be established by taking account of the complicated data of the problem.

I will not treat here incidentally of so grave a question; some day the occasion will present itself for our returning to it. Yet let us be careful in every reform not to efface from the law its moral signature and its high character of duty. Let us not *demoralise* either the act or the punishment; this would be contrary to social utility; and I make this criticism without accusing M. Landry of not having recognised it.

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From DR. J. J. VAN BIERVLIET, whose *Studies in Psychology* I should have mentioned before, we have a series of excellent *Causeries psychologiques*. The learned author recapitulates here in clear form and concise language the results of the experimentalists on the following different subjects: the reverse sides of joy and sadness, the problem of memory, and the forms of embarrassment.

We have from M. ANDRÉ MAYER an *Essay on Thirst* (*Essai sur la soif*), an excellent review of which by Dr. Dumas will be found in the *Revue Philosophique* for June, 1902; from M. BOURDON a volume on the *Visual Perception of Space* (Paris, Schleicher, publisher); from M. G. ENCAUSSE (Papus), *L'occultisme et le spiritualisme, théories philosophiques et adaptations de l'occultisme*, illustrated with figures, one of which represents the physical organs of the *astral man*!

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The Historical Collection of Great Philosophers has two new volumes, one by the ABBÉ LAFONTAINE entitled, *Le plaisir d'après Platon et Aristote*, an excellent work in philosophical analysis, justifying and consummating the doctrine of Eudemonism; and the other by M. PAUL LOUIS COUCHOUD on *Benoit Spinoza*.

M. XAVIER LÉON gives us *La philosophie de Fichte*, an extensive work to which M. Émile Boutroux has added a preface. M. JOSEPH FABRE begins in *La pensée antique, de Moïse à Marc-Aurèle*, a sketch of the evolution of human thought; his work is composed mostly of citations.

The *Année psychologique* and the *Année sociologique* still continue to be valuable and complete; they are indispensable to all workers in this field. The last-mentioned volume contains two original memoirs, one by M. SIMIAND, *Étude sur le prix du charbon en France et au 19 siècle*; the other by M. DURKHEIM, *Sur le totémisme*. M. Simiand's study is an essay, which I can highly praise, on the precise determination of an important economic phenomenon. M. Durkheim labors to fix precisely the notion of totemism by taking up anew the criticism of the facts gathered by Spencer and Gillen in their beautiful book on the central tribes of Australia.

The *Année philosophique* comprises studies by M. BROCHARD, *L'œuvre de Socrate*, by M. HAMELIN, *Sur la logique des Stoiciens*, by M. ROBIN, *Le traité de l'âme d'Aristote*, by M. DAURIAC, *Essai sur la catégorie de l'être*, and by M. PILLON, *La critique de Bayle, critique du théisme cartésien*. The French bibliography for the year 1901, which is entirely the work of M. Pillon, contains not less than one hundred and five works. This is more than we mentioned in our "Correspondence" for that year, but I have no reason to regret the omissions. I am compelled to choose among many works which are not at all deserving of the same degree of attention. My principal object is to review philosophical questions in connection with a few important books, so far as this is possible for me.

But I shall add several names to my list taken from the bibliography above mentioned: ARVÈDE BARINE, *St. Francois d'Assise et la légende des trois compagnons* (Hachette, publisher); H. BREMOND, *L'inquietude religieuse, Aubes et lendemains de conversion* (Perrin, publisher); CHARLES BYSE, *Le prophète du Nord, vie et doctrine de Swedenborg* (Fischbacher, publisher); G. FULLIQUET, *Les expériences religieuses d'Israël (ibid.)*; JEAN RÉVILLE, *Le quatrième évangile son origine et sa valeur historique* (Leroux, publisher); M. MURET, *L'esprit juif* (Perrin, publisher); E. FAGUET, *Problème politique du temps présent* (A. Colin, publisher); and last but not least, the beautiful work of M. E. BOUTMY, *Essai d'une psychologie politique du peuple anglais* (A. Colin, publisher).

LUCIEN ARRÉAT.

PARIS, FRANCE.